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Abstract. The amount of realist positions put forward by philosophers of 
religion and theologians is impressive. one can certainly doubt whether there 
is a need for yet another alternative. However, most realist positions employed 
in studies on religion fall prey to Hilary Putnam’s criticism against metaphysical 
realism. This gives rise to a dilemma that I aim at solving by introducing yet 
another realist position, namely non-metaphysical realism.
THe oNSeT oF A DIlemmA
like many proponents of realist positions, I assume that we have need of 
a philosophical perspective that allows us to conceptualize and discuss 
utterances made in religious contexts as statements about a reality that 
exists independently of us and that we humans share with each other. 
We might not be able to justify those statements. However, such failures 
should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the utterances in 
question are not, properly speaking, statements.
This basic assumption causes a dilemma that I believe we have to come 
to terms with. It arises within philosophy of religion due to some widely 
acclaimed arguments in realism debates within other philosophical 
fields. I will formulate this dilemma in personal terms since I know that 
not every philosopher of religion struggles with it. Its emergence rests on 
certain presuppositions.
on the one hand, I think that most believers understand at least some 
of the claims made in religious contexts as evidence-transcendent truths 
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concerning a shared independent reality. Consequently, a philosopher of 
religion aiming at analyzing religious ideas as they, in fact, are understood 
by believers needs access to a  philosophical perspective that suggests 
that assertions made within religious contexts can be conceptualized in 
such a way. In addition to this, I believe that we philosophers need access 
to such a perspective since we at times have to argue that certain claims 
or certain activities that a  particular religious context includes in fact 
presuppose the truth of some statements about a reality that we share 
with each other, even if the believers are unaware of this or explicitly deny 
this. occasionally, we have to critically discuss such implicit truth-claims 
since they might have a negative impact on our shared social life, or yield 
unwanted consequences for the well-being of certain individuals.
on the other hand, I  find Hilary Putnam’s arguments against the 
philosophical perspective that he identifies as metaphysical realism 
convincing. my study of his reasoning caused something of a philoso-
phical conversion in my life. Today, I take it that metaphysical realism 
is a  philosophically untenable perspective that we have to abandon. 
unfortunately, it is the most obvious option for those of us who want 
to conceptualize claims made in religious contexts as statements about 
a shared independent reality that may be evidence-transcendent truths. 
For this reason, some philosophers of religion are extremely unwilling to 
take leave of metaphysical realism. To them it seems as if a rejection of 
metaphysical realism would deprive us of every possibility to properly 
construe and justly criticize religious beliefs.
The two horns of my dilemma generate a challenging question. Can 
we conceptualize claims made in religious contexts as statements about 
a shared independent reality, statements that might be true even if we are 
unable to justify them, without presupposing metaphysical realism, at 
least not in a form that is affected by Putnam’s criticism? In the following, 
I will elaborate an affirmative answer to this question by applying the 
non-metaphysical realist position that I identify and recommend. I will 
organize my argument in the following way: Initially, I  will present 
metaphysical realism as it is understood by Putnam and me. Then I will 
summarize two lines of reasoning that I identify in Putnam’s arguments 
against metaphysical realism and that I find convincing. In doing that, 
I will explicate some important presuppositions that his arguments rest 
on. In view of this clarification, I will distinguish what I take to be three 
different dimensions of the realism debates. In addition to metaphysical 
realism, I  will define semantic realism and epistemological realism. 
5NoN-meTAPHYSICAl reAlISm
In light of this demarcation, I will argue that one can be a semantic realist 
and an  epistemological realist without having to be a  metaphysical 
realist. lastly, I  will show that this possibility includes the conclusion 
that I aim for.
meTAPHYSICAl reAlISm
Putnam identifies metaphysical realism as a  philosophical perspective 
comprising three central theses. His definition in Reason, Truth and 
History reads as follows:
on this perspective [i.e. metaphysical realism], the world consists of 
some fixed totality of mind-independent objects. There is exactly one 
true and complete description of ‘the way the world is’. Truth involves 
some sort of correspondence relation between words or thought-signs 
and external things and sets of things. I  shall call this perspective the 
externalist perspective, because its favorite point of view is a God’s eye 
point of view.1
I will explain how I understand Putnam’s characterization of metaphysical 
realism by adding a  few clarifications to the citation. Firstly, the 
metaphysical realist argues that reality consists of some fixed totality of 
mind-independent objects. According to me, this fixed totality of mind-
independent objects can be portrayed as a reality-in-itself, a reality that 
might be beyond human cognition. What is important to my argument 
is not that this totality is fixed. Instead, it is the mind-independence that 
is associated with this reality-in-itself that is essential. The metaphysical 
realist argues that there may be objects or states of affairs in reality-
in-itself which human beings cannot experience or describe. William 
Alston, a  philosopher whom I  consider to be a  metaphysical realist, 
illustrates what this implies. Alston writes:
Isn’t it highly likely that there are facts that will forever lie beyond us 
just because of [human] limitations? [...] The cognitive design of human 
beings represents only one of a  large multitude of possible designs for 
cognitive subjects. [...] Given all this, shouldn’t we take seriously the 
possibility that even if there is something wrong with the idea of facts 
that are in principle inaccessible to any cognitive subjects (and I don’t 
see any fatal flaw in this idea), it could still be that there are many facts 
1 Putnam 1981: 49.
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accessible to cognizers with radically different hardware and software 
but totally inaccessible to us.2
In this passage, Alston opens up two possibilities. Firstly, he assumes 
that there can be states of affairs in reality that no cognitive subject has 
access to. Secondly, he claims that there may be states of affairs that only 
some kind of non-human cognizers have access to. What is common 
to both of these notions is the assumption that there may be states of 
affairs in reality that are completely inaccessible to human beings. This 
is the essence of the metaphysical realist’s understanding of mind-
independent reality.
Secondly, the metaphysical realist assumes that there is only one true 
and complete description of reality-in-itself. She needs not hold that 
we have access to this one true description; the fact that her ‘God’s-eye 
point of view’ is an externalist perspective in relation to us humans and 
to our abilities may well imply that it is impossible for us humans to 
formulate the one true and complete description of reality. However, this 
one true and complete description of reality can nevertheless exist, and 
it can consist of, for example, all true propositions or every claim that 
an omniscient God, if such a God exists, would be able to verify.
Thirdly, the metaphysical realist would argue that we speak the truth 
insofar as our utterances correspond to states of affairs of this independent 
reality. Different metaphysical realists describe this correspondence in 
different ways but what they all agree on is that it is entirely possible 
that we do not know, and cannot know, that a true statement is in fact 
true. We may not have any verification methods with the help of which 
we can find out if the utterance in question is true or false and we may 
never be able to access such methods. It may be that it is in principle 
impossible for us to know any such truths, but the utterance in question 
can nevertheless be true as long as it corresponds to the states of affairs 
of independent reality.
Putnam states that the most important consequence of metaphysical 
realism is that truth is supposed to be radically non-epistemic.3 The 
metaphysical realist would argue that what is true is independent of our 
abilities to find out whether it is true. What is true is independent of our 
practice of seeking knowledge and of our criteria for when something 
can be said to be true. This implies that it is entirely possible that 
2 Alston 1997: 64-65.
3 Putnam 1978: 125.
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an utterance can meet the criteria for truth that we presuppose in our 
practice of seeking knowledge but that the utterance may nevertheless be 
false. What is true is not determined by us, from an internal perspective, 
but rather by reality-in-itself, from an  external perspective. Putnam’s 
arguments against metaphysical realism concern this externalism. In 
short, Putnam argues that it doesn’t make sense.
THe uNTeNAbIlITY oF meTAPHYSICAl reAlISm
Putnam repudiates metaphysical realism by composing several different 
arguments against it. I  will concentrate on two objections that are 
common to some of them. The first line of reasoning emphasizes that 
we cannot refer to a  reality-in-itself that is beyond human cognition. 
Therefore, we cannot state that such a  reality exists. The second line 
of reasoning maintains that if metaphysical realism is correct, then we 
would not be able to communicate with each other. However, we are 
able to communicate with each other, we do it every day. Therefore, 
metaphysical realism cannot be an accurate perspective.
I  will explicate these two lines of reasoning in connection to 
Putnam’s most amusing example, namely his brains in a vat scenario.4 
In elaborating the first line of reasoning, Putnam argues that the 
metaphysical realist’s thesis that we might be brains in a vat, although 
we are unable to discover that this is the case, is self-contradictory. It 
is a  thesis which, if true, implies its own falsity. The reason is that we 
cannot refer to the metaphysical possibility that we are brains in a vat. 
Although such brains can think the words ‘We are brains in a vat’, they 
cannot, Putnam maintains, refer to the same things that we refer to when 
we use the concepts ‘brain’ and ‘vat’ (supposing that we are not brains in 
a vat). For this reason, they can neither think nor say that they are brains 
in a vat (in independent reality) even if they think or say the words ‘We 
are brains in a vat’. The brain in a vat that thinks or says ‘I am a brain in 
a vat’ is wrong in the same sense that a person who says ‘I am dreaming’ 
is wrong when she (in the dream) is not dreaming that she is dreaming.5
This line of reasoning rests on the presupposition that the brain’s 
words cannot, in some mysterious way, hook onto a reality-in-itself that 
is completely beyond the reality that the brain experiences. According 
4 Putnam 1981: 5-6.
5 Johannesson 2007: 60-63.
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to Putnam, we can never refer to such a reality-in-itself since we must 
interact with that which we are talking about if we are to be able to say 
that our words refer to that which we are talking about. Consequently, we 
can never correctly state that the reality-in-itself that the metaphysical 
realist identifies exists.6
The decisive element in the second line of reasoning can best be 
explained in relation to the metaphysical realist’s assumption that a theory 
that we deem to be ideal in fact might be false.7 An ideal theory is a theory 
that under perfect circumstances for justification meets all the operational 
and theoretical constraints that we can think of. The metaphysical realist 
holds that such a theory could be wrong. For example, the theory that 
we are not brains in a vat can be false even if there are no circumstances 
under which we can discover that this is the case.
Putnam argues that the metaphysical realist’s assumption that even 
a theory that we consider to be ideal might be false jeopardizes human 
communication. The reason is that we would not be able to learn what 
it implies that something is true if truth and idealized justification 
were separated from each other in the manner that the metaphysical 
realist presupposes. Since truth-claims are crucial to our interpretation 
of each other’s utterances, as Quine and Davidson point out, we have 
to grasp what it entails that something is true in order to learn and 
master a  language. Since we humans do understand each other, at 
least now and then, the metaphysical realist’s differentiation between 
truth and our criteria for rational acceptability has to be erroneous. If 
truth and idealized justification were disunited, language learning and 
communication would be impossible.8
According to Putnam and the internal realism that he suggests, we can 
only learn to talk about truth and tell the truth if our discourse on truth is 
related to our conceptions of sufficiently good conditions for justification. 
We may disagree on what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for the 
justification of a  certain statement. Such variations do not jeopardize 
human communication. As long as every truth-claim is associated with 
some notion about what would constitute sufficiently good conditions 
for its justification we can understand what it implies that it is true. by 
identifying the situations in which a certain speaker or a certain group 
6 Johannesson 2007: 63-64.
7 Johannesson 2007: 78-80.
8 Johannesson 2007: 99.
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of speakers, i.e. a  particular linguistic community, is willing to make 
a particular statement, we are able to interpret its meaning.9
Putnam’s argumentation reveals a certain entanglement of idealized 
rational acceptability, truth and correct linguistic behaviour that is 
essential to my argument. According to Putnam’s internal realism, 
our ideas about correct linguistic behaviour reveal what we take to be 
sufficiently good conditions for justification and, consequently, they are 
the key to our understanding of truth. To say that something is true is to 
say that in a situation where sufficiently good conditions for justification 
are realized, we would consider a speaker in that situation to be justified 
in making the statement in question. In other words, the statement 
would be a manifestation of correct linguistic behaviour.
The entanglement of idealized rational acceptability, truth and correct 
linguistic behaviour implies that what constitutes sufficiently good 
conditions for justification can be discerned in our ideas about correct 
linguistic behaviour. The situations in which we consider ourselves to be 
entitled to make a certain statement are what clarify both our ideas about 
sufficiently good conditions for justifying that particular statement and 
what it implies that the statement is true. Thus, truth emerges as closely 
related to our conceptual resources insofar as it is linked to the correct 
usage of the conceptual resources that we have access to.
This linkage between our conceptual resources and truth is vital to 
my reasoning. The combination of semantic and epistemological realism 
that I  recommend is a  certain exposition of it. I  will account for this 
combination in light of a particular demarcation between different kinds 
of realism.
reAlISm IN THree DIFFereNT DImeNSIoNS
I will assume that there are three different dimensions to the concept of 
‘realism’. Since I understand ‘anti-realism’ as a term denoting the rejection 
of some kind of realism, I will correspondingly postulate that there are 
three different dimensions to the concept of ‘anti-realism’ as well.
The first dimension consists of the debate between metaphysical 
realists and metaphysical anti-realists. I  recognize metaphysical anti-
realism as an  explicit rejection of metaphysical realism and its three 
9 Johannesson 2007: 148-150.
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theses. Therefore, metaphysical anti-realism presupposes metaphysical 
realism in a  certain sense. If metaphysical realism is unintelligible to 
us, then we cannot possibly understand the metaphysical anti-realist’s 
denial of metaphysical realism either. Consequently, any criticism of 
metaphysical realism affects metaphysical anti-realism, as well.
The second dimension is epistemological and it concerns the 
existence of evidence-transcendent truths, i.e. truths that we humans 
cannot verify. An epistemological realist is of the opinion that there may 
be such truths. An epistemological anti-realist denies this.
The third dimension is semantic. my portrayal of it is closely related 
to michael Dummett’s work. like Dummett, I  take it that the realism 
debate, in its semantic form, is about which utterances we are entitled 
to conceive of as statements, that is, as sentences that are either true or 
false. If one is a semantic realist regarding a certain expression or group 
of utterances, then one claims that this expression or this group of 
utterances are statements, i.e. we are entitled to assume the principle of 
bivalence for this sentence or class of sentences. If one is an anti-realist 
one maintains that the saying or sayings in question cannot be properly 
understood as truth-claims. We are not entitled to assume that they are 
either true or false.10
my aim when I distinguish these three dimensions to the concepts of 
‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’ respectively is to argue that one can be a realist 
in one of these dimensions without having to adopt a realist position in 
all three dimension. metaphysical realism is, arguably, a philosophical 
perspective that entails a  comprehensive epistemological realism and 
a wide-ranging semantic realism. The metaphysical realist maintains that 
a certain claim about reality can be correctly understood as a statement 
even if we cannot imagine any situation in which conditions for its 
justification would be sufficiently good for us to be able determine its 
truth-value. Thus, she maintains that a particular statement can be true 
even if we do not know of any situation in which it would be correct to 
use it. This is an extensive semantic realism. Furthermore, she assumes 
that there might be truths that we cannot verify because they concern 
states of affairs that are beyond human cognition. This, in turn, is 
a comprehensive epistemological realism.
my main point is that not only the metaphysical realist but also the 
non-metaphysical realist can approve of a  quite far-reaching semantic 
10 Johannesson 2007: 176-177. Cf. Dummett 1993: 230.
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realism as well as an  epistemological realist position without falling 
prey to Putnam’s criticism. I  will describe this possibility by adopting 
the following strategy: I  will take Dummett’s characterization of the 
disagreement between semantic realists and semantic anti-realists as my 
point of departure. Then I will argue that we, in light of Putnam’s internal 
realism, are entitled to be semantic realists in more cases than Dummett 
allows for. After that I will return to Dummett’s work and show that we 
can achieve a corresponding expansion of epistemological realism using 
Putnam’s internal realism.
SemANTIC reAlISm
The question Dummett seeks to answer is the following: under what 
circumstances are we entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for 
some class of statements? Dummett examines two alternative answers 
to this question. The first one is the idea that we are entitled to assume 
the principle of bivalence for a given class of statements, independently 
of whether or not we know the truth-value of every statement in the 
class. The other alternative answer examined is the idea that we are only 
entitled to assume the principle of bivalence in cases where we are able 
to determine whether each individual statement in the given class is true 
or false.11
Dummett argues in favour of the second alternative. Accordingly, 
he is of the opinion that we are only entitled to assume the principle 
of bivalence for effectively decidable statements, i.e. utterances whose 
truth-value we can decide. What makes Dummett draw this conclusion 
is the assumption that we only know for sure that a  certain class of 
sentences are either true or false when we are able to determine their 
truth-value. like Putnam, Dummett claims that if language learning is 
to be at all possible, then our practice when it comes to making truth-
claims and talking about what is true must relate issues about what is 
true to our knowledge about which statements we can verify or falsify 
and to the methods of verification and falsification that are available to 
us. However, unlike Putnam, Dummett assumes that our actual practice 
of verifying or falsifying statements limits our possibilities to justly claim 
that a certain utterance is either true or false. 12
11 Johannesson 2007: 178; Dummett 1978: xix, xxxi, 146.
12 Johannesson 2007: 148, 180. Cf. Putnam 1983: 84.
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According to Putnam, righteousness goes beyond justification in 
a  sense that Dummett finds unintelligible. Putnam’s and Dummett’s 
diverging opinions concerning the relationship between truth and 
justification has to do with their different judgments regarding what is 
required for us to be able to learn a language and understand each other.
To me, it seems to be the case that if we are to be able to recognize 
and understand truth-claims, a capacity that is decisive for our ability 
to learn and master a  language, we can only correctly assume that 
utterances that are associated with some notion of sufficiently good 
conditions for justification are statements.13 For this reason, I agree to 
a  certain interpretation of Putnam’s position. I  assume that for every 
utterance that we can accurately conceptualize as a  statement, we can 
imagine a  situation in which some speaker would consider herself to 
be justified in uttering the sentence in question. In such cases, we can 
understand what it implies for the utterance to be true. If we are unable to 
imagine any situation in which a speaker might want to utter a particular 
statement, we are not entitled to assume that that sentence is a statement.
The position that I advocate implies a certain enlargement of the scope 
of semantic realism. Inspired by Putnam, I argue that we are entitled to 
assume the principle of bivalence in further cases than Dummett admits. 
most importantly, I  believe that our incapacity to provide what we 
consider to be sufficiently good conditions for justification of a certain 
statement does not always entail the conclusion that the statement in 
question is not, properly speaking, a statement. even if we cannot provide 
what we consider to be sufficiently good conditions for the justification 
of a  certain statement we are entitled to assume that the statement is 
a statement as long as we can imagine some situation in which it would 
be correct to make the statement in question. Consequently, it is only 
our capacity to imagine what constitutes a correct linguistic behaviour, 
i.e. a correct use of a certain statement, which sets the boundaries for 
semantic realism.14
eVIDeNCe-TrANSCeNDeNT TruTHS
Semantic realism is linked to epistemological realism in such a way that 
one can only be an epistemological realist in relation to sentences that 
13 Cf. Johannesson 2007: 200-201.
14 Johannesson 2007: 200, 204.
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can be conceived of in a semantic realist way. Against the background of 
my assumption that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence 
for utterances that are associated with a discernible idea of sufficiently 
good conditions for justification, I will explicate the kind of evidence-
transcendent truths that I  think we can allow for. In addition, I  will 
identify two kinds of evidence-transcendent truths that metaphysical 
realists such as Alston might find comprehensible but which I  find 
unintelligible.
once again my point of departure will be Dummett’s more limited 
acceptance of semantic realism. Dummett’s position seems to exclude 
the existence of evidence-transcendent truths. However, I  believe that 
even Dummett’s position leaves a certain room for such truths.15 In light 
of the more wide-ranging semantic realism that I advocate, this space 
can be extended. I will describe what this expansion implies in relation 
to two categories of evidence-transcendent truths that I think Dummett 
and like-minded philosophers have to reckon with.
Firstly, Dummett assumes that a particular statement is either verifiable 
or not. However, verification does not always come fully at once. A lot of 
the statements that we make are, for the moment, only partly verifiable. 
Such statements can be thought of as evidence-transcendent truths.16 
The non-metaphysical realist would definitely agree to this possibility 
since inconclusively verified truths are associated with an idea of what 
would constitute sufficiently good conditions for their final justification. 
Dummett, in turn, could assume that there are evidence-transcendent 
truths of this kind if he was of the opinion that we are entitled to assume 
the principle of bivalence for sentences that are verifiable, but not yet 
conclusively verified or falsified.
Secondly, Dummett holds that we are entitled to assume the principle 
of bivalence for sentences that we can verify or falsify in a finite time. If 
he allows this time period to be a relatively long one, then he can be of 
the opinion that we are entitled to assume the principle of bivalence for 
sentences that we can verify or falsify in principle, though perhaps not in 
practice.17 This is the position that I support.
like Dummett, I assume that it is absurd to hold that a sentence can 
be true even though there is nothing whatever such that, if we knew of it, 
15 Johannesson 2007: 192-193.
16 Johannesson 2007: 192.
17 Johannesson 2007: 192-193.
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we should count it as evidence or ground for the truth of the statement.18 
This is the essence of the assumption that every statement has to be 
associated with some idea concerning what constitutes sufficiently good 
conditions for its justification. However, unlike Dummett I believe that 
we do not have to be in possession of so much evidence that we can 
verify a certain statement in order for us to be able to rightly conclude 
that it is a statement.
In fact, occasionally we can rightly argue that a  certain statement 
has truth-conditions which are satisfied, or which are not satisfied, 
even if there is neither any evidence supporting the conclusion that the 
statement is true, nor any evidence supporting the conclusion that it is 
false. Admittedly, every statement cannot be of this kind. In that case, 
we would not be able to learn what it implies that something is true and, 
consequently, we would be unable to learn a  language. However, once 
we master a language, we can sometimes justly claim that the principle 
of bivalence applies to a certain statement even if we haven’t got a clue as 
to its truth-value.19
If one reasons as I  do, there is a  rather large space for evidence-
transcendent truths. However, two kinds of evidence-transcendent 
truths that the metaphysical realist might want to reckon with are 
excluded. Firstly, my non-metaphysical realist perspective excludes 
the possibility that there might be truths for which we cannot envision 
sufficiently good conditions for justification. If we do not know when 
it would be correct for us to make a  certain statement, we cannot 
meaningfully imagine what it implies that the statement in question is 
an evidence-transcendent truth.20
Secondly, we cannot meaningfully imagine the possibility that there 
might be evidence-transcendent truths that we cannot formulate, using 
our conceptual resources. Arguably, there are truths that I as an individual 
cannot express. However, we cannot comprehend the existence of 
truths which are altogether beyond human conceptualization.21 The 
entanglement of truth, idealized justification and correct linguistic 
behaviour excludes this kind of evidence-transcendent truths. 
Nevertheless, I believe that we are entitled to conceptualize truth as in 
18 Dummett 1978: 15.
19 Johannesson 2007: 193-194.
20 Johannesson 2007: 162.
21 Johannesson 2007: 161.
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a certain sense independent of us and our language. Next, I will turn to 
the interdependence between semantic realism and ontological issues in 
order to explain how this is possible.
STATemeNTS AbouT A SHAreD INDePeNDeNT reAlITY
According to Dummett and Putnam, our approach to semantic realism 
affects not only our possibilities of assuming that there are evidence-
transcendent truths, but also our view of the constitution of reality. This 
is because there is a correlation between true sentences and facts. The 
correlation entails that there can be no facts, no states of affairs in reality, 
which we are unable to express in statements, using our conceptual 
resources.
Admittedly, what this implies is that in a  certain sense, that which 
exists independently of us and our language depends on us and our 
language. our ability to imagine states of affairs in reality presupposes 
our concept formation and our practice of justifying statements. To some, 
for example to Alston, this might seem as an obvious rejection of the 
claim that many believe sets realism apart, namely the claim that reality 
is independent of us human beings and our outlook. Furthermore, since 
conceptual resources and ideas about what would constitute sufficiently 
good conditions for the justification of a certain statement vary across 
temporal and cultural boundaries, this dependence may appear to result 
in the conclusion that we can never justly claim that a certain statement 
is true for everyone, even for ancient people who did not speak the 
language by means of which the statement is expressed.
However, the fact that we need access to some set of conceptual 
resources in order to express a statement does not necessarily imply that 
a certain statement is true only for speakers of a particular language or 
that it would cease to be true if no speakers were to be found. That this 
conclusion doesn’t follow depends on our possibility to conceptualize 
truths as objective and true to us all by universalizing our current 
conceptual scheme.
I  will illustrate what such a  generalization entails with the help of 
an  example. We consider the statement ‘The sky is blue’ to be true. 
This means that, according to us, the sky would have been blue even if 
our conceptual resources had been radically different and we had had 
completely different concepts of colour. Furthermore, we believe that 
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the sky would have been blue even if there had been no human beings 
around to state that the sky is blue. In this regard, the colour of the sky is, 
according to us, independent of us.22
However, the fact that the sky is blue, and the statement that it is 
blue, cannot exist independently of us and our conceptual resources. 
Independently of us and our conceptual resources, the fact that the sky 
is blue cannot be discerned, and the statement that the sky is blue cannot 
be formulated. Thus, in a  certain sense, it is we and the decisions we 
make when we develop our conceptual resources that determine what 
might be a fact.23
However, this does not imply that we cannot conceptualize statements 
as about a shared independent reality or justly claim that they, if they are 
true, are true for everyone; quite the opposite. by assuming a particular 
conception of what might constitute sufficiently good conditions for the 
justification of a certain statement, we can maintain that the statement 
in question is true (or false) not only for us but also for people who do 
not share our conceptual resources or our conception of what constitutes 
sufficiently good conditions for justification.
The core of this claim might be summarized as follows: When we 
make a statement we assume that what it implies for this statement to 
be true is that, if a speaker who masters our language and finds herself 
in a  situation where sufficiently good conditions for justification are 
realized (i.e. sufficiently good conditions according to our standards) 
were to make the statement in question, she would be fully warranted in 
accepting that statement as true. In universalizing our current conceptual 
scheme, we are universalizing our conceptions of sufficiently good 
conditions for justification as well as our conceptual resources. by doing 
that, we are able to claim that a certain statement is true independently of 
us and to us all. Whether this claim is correct or not can subsequently be 
discussed, even among people who do not share the same conception of 
sufficiently good conditions for justification for this particular statement.
CoNCluSIoN
In conclusion, I will return to the two horns of the dilemma that is the 
upshot of my argument. on the one hand, I take it that we need access 
22 Putnam 1996: 302; Johannesson 2007: 146-147.
23 Putnam 1996: 302; Johannesson 2007: 146-147.
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to a  philosophical perspective that suggests that assertions made in 
religious contexts can be conceptualized as statements about a  shared 
independent reality, statements that might be true even if we are unable 
to justify them. on the other hand, I believe that we cannot make use of 
the metaphysical realist perspective since language-learning and human 
communication appear to be a  complete mystery if our discourse on 
truth and our notions about sufficiently good conditions of justification 
and correct linguistic behaviour are isolated from each other.
The solution that I propose is a particular realist outlook. It consists in 
a certain combination of semantic realism and epistemological realism 
and it can be summarized as follows:
(1) We are entitled to assume that a certain utterance is a statement, 
i.e. that it is either true or false, if it is associated with a particular 
conception of what constitutes sufficiently good conditions for its 
justification, a conception that we can discern by identifying in 
what situation it would be appropriate to make the statement or 
conclude that it is false.
(2) We are entitled to conceptualize an unverified statement as an 
evidence-transcendent truth if we can imagine its justification 
and would recognize a situation in which it would be appropriate 
to make the statement.
(3) We are entitled to conceive of a particular truth-claim as being 
about an independent reality that is common to all of us in those 
cases where we can universalize a certain set of linguistic resources 
and a particular conception of sufficiently good conditions for its 
justification.
by adopting this kind of realism, i.e. non-metaphysical realism, I believe 
that we can conceptualize certain religious claims as statements and as 
an  evidence-transcendent truth about an  independent reality that we 
share with each other without being affected by Putnam’s criticism of 
metaphysical realism. Furthermore, in light of this kind of realism the 
task to distinguish and critically discuss different opinions about what 
would constitute sufficiently good conditions for the justification of 
frequently occurring religious statements stands out as a major task for 
the philosopher of religion. In carrying out this kind of work, I  think 
that the philosopher can contribute an analysis that can be useful also for 
theologians and religious people since it might, for example, help people 
to overcome religious doubts or facilitate the dialogue between different 
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religious traditions. This is a major advantage according to those of us 
who believe that philosophical work should be of relevance also to others 
than the ones conducting it.
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